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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 6030
This paper analyzes the impact of two distinct shocks 
stemming from the cross-border transmission of the 
2007-2009 crisis on credit availability for small firms. 
The paper uses data from AccessBank Azerbaijan which 
was affected in its liquidity position during the second 
and third quarters of 2008 by delays in its refinancing. 
The Azeri real economy was hit by the global crisis from 
the fourth quarter of 2008 onwards with a combined 
decline in oil prices, exports, remittances, and domestic 
demand. Therefore, a pure supply side shock con be 
This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Unit, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at gberg@worldbank.org.  
contrasted with a real economy shock that hit exactly 
when the bank’s funding position strengthened again. 
The paper finds that during the funding shock (potential) 
borrowers are discouraged from applying for loans. 
However, for those applications made, the likelihood of 
loan approval is not affected. The real economy shock, in 
contrast, reduces the approval likelihood for SME loans 
in particular, while agro and micro loans are considerably 
less affected. Finally, bank relationships increase credit 
availability in good as well as in bad times.
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 2 
1 Introduction 
The integration and development of emerging countries’ financial systems benefitted 
them by increased supply of finance and economic growth (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2004), Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and Giannetti and Ongena (2009)). At the same 
time, these countries became more likely to feel the spillovers of shocks, such as the 2007-
2009 financial crisis, that originated unrelated to local economic conditions.
1
 Banks’ lending 
to micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME banks) in emerging countries and their 
customers were mostly resilient to the effects of previous financial crises, whereas they are 
more likely to be affected by the recent crisis because they have also become more globally 
integrated in the past decade (Di Bella (2011), Galema, Lensink and Spierdijk (2011)). The 
aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the different channels through which the recent 
crisis was transmitted to banks providing lending to MSMEs and their borrowers in emerging 
markets. 
The impact of financial crises on the loan portfolio of MSME banks is ex ante unclear. 
Banks facing liquidity shortages may be forced to cut down lending. At the same time banks 
might be reluctant to reject loan applications of existing borrowers even in times of crisis 
because they have invested in costly information acquisition (Rajan (1992), De Haas and Van 
Horen (2010)). With respect to the clients, a larger proportion of microenterprises, in contrast 
to SME businesses, is engaged in the supply of essential goods and services, for which 
demand fluctuates less even in times of crisis (Littlefield and Kneiding (2009)). However, it is 
also possible that micro borrowers are more severely hit by the crisis since especially in 
advanced and competitive (microfinance) markets the boundaries between micro loans and 
consumer finance have more and more blurred (e.g. Christen (2001) and Littlefield and 
Rosenberg (2004)). In such markets, many micro entrepreneurs have borrowed from multiple 
sources and accumulated high levels of debt which makes them vulnerable to even small 
changes in their income. While there is substantial evidence on the effects of the crisis on 
bank lending in general,
2
 the evidence on how MSME banks and their clients are hit is 
anecdotal so far. Also, there is only limited evidence on how exactly banks reacted to 
different shocks that occurred during the crisis.  
                                                 
1
 The unfolding of the crisis events is e.g. described in Brunnermeier (2009) and Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010). Popov and Udell (2011), De Haas, Korniyenko, Loukoianova and Pivovarsky (2012) and Ongena, 
Peydro and Van Horen (2012) study how borrowers in Emerging Europe are affected due to the cross-border 
transmission of the crisis in foreign-owned and internationally funded banks. 
2
 De Haas and Van Horen (2010), Huang (2010), Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010), De Haas and Van Horen 
(2011), De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2011) and Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2012) provide evidence on 
the worldwide effects of the crisis and the transmission mechanisms.  
 3 
In this paper, we study two distinct shocks stemming from the global transmission of the 
crisis and their respective impact on credit availability for micro, small and medium firms. 
We analyze a unique dataset including information from all business loan applications and 
loan contracts of AccessBank Azerbaijan between 2006 and 2009. The bank provides an 
interesting object of study since it is foreign-owned and largely refinanced in foreign currency 
as are many MSME banks in the region. Due to the distortions in international capital 
markets, which, for instance, made the placement of a CDO impossible, the bank was hit by 
unforeseen delays in its refinancing pipeline in the second and third quarters of 2008 (the first 
shock) although its financial performance remained very strong.  
At the same time, Azerbaijan’s economy proved resilient to the international turmoil up 
to the last quarter of 2008 when economic growth eventually slowed down (IMF (2008), 
Hübner and Jainzik (2009)). The timeline of events in Azerbaijan allows us to study a pure 
supply side shock, the Funding shock, while firms had not yet been affected by the economic 
crisis (see also Dooley and Hutchison (2009) for this so-called decoupling of emerging 
markets in the beginning of the crisis). Then, we can contrast its impact on credit availability 
for firms of different sizes and industries from the impact of the Real economy shock (the 
second shock). Important for our study is that AccessBank Azerbaijan faced a short period of 
tight refinancing at a time when the economic crisis was still absent from the country, while 
its refinancing pipeline strengthened again from the fourth quarter of 2008 onwards, i.e. 
exactly at the time when Azerbaijan’s economy started to slow down. This setting allows us 
to study how banks react to different shocks coming from the funding vs. the real economy 
side of their business and the mechanisms they have at hand. 
Observing loan applications and the bank’s decision whether to approve the application, 
we assess which loan types (agro, micro and SME) are affected most within the two channels 
identified. During the economic slowdown, we expect SME loans to be affected most as their 
credit quality is likely to deteriorate most. SME businesses, compared to microenterprises, are 
involved in a broader variety of activities and are more likely to provide non-subsistence 
goods and services (such as furniture and household appliances or real estate services), for 
which demand typically decreases in economic downturns, or may be suppliers to the oil 
industry.
3
 Finally, we examine whether previous bank-borrower relationships help to mitigate 
credit constraints.  
                                                 
3
 See e.g. http://www.cdcdevelopmentsolutions.org/eastern-europe-and-caucasus#Azerbijan for efforts to 
increase SME capacities to win contracts with the oil industry in Azerbaijan. See IFC (2009) for a comparison of 
sectors in which SMEs and individual entrepreneurs are active. 
 4 
  For the first channel, we study aggregate numbers of loan requests and approvals. Our 
results suggest that the bank discourages potential borrowers from applying for new loans 
and, to a lesser extent, existing customers from requesting additional loans during the period 
of tight refinancing in the second and third quarters of 2008 (see Brown, Ongena, Popov and 
Yesin (2011) and Popov and Udell (2011) for the importance of discouragement in Eastern 
Europe). The bank’s temporary liquidity squeeze therefore resulted in a slowdown of 
portfolio growth because lending had to be limited, thereby affecting all borrower groups. 
Generally, one would expect a pure supply shock to mainly influence the bank’s ability to 
meet existing loan requests. However, it may also mirror itself in the number of loan 
applications because of the particular marketing strategy of AccessBank (and similar MSME 
banks)
4
. MSMEs in Azerbaijan, and those that have never had a loan before in particular, do 
not seem to know much about the services banks offer (IFC (2009)). To attract new 
borrowers, the bank therefore regularly organizes local community events to market its 
products. Also, the bank’s staff may visit the surrounding potential clients and call their 
attention to the bank’s business. During the time of tight refinancing, loan officers were 
encouraged to take vacation which is equal to curtailing the active marketing of the products 
and thus the number of loan applications may also decline due to the temporary squeeze in the 
bank’s liquidity. 
Second, we measure credit availability by the likelihood that a loan application is 
approved. For the funding shock we find that approval rates for those (potential) borrowers 
who actually apply for a loan are not negatively affected in any borrower group. This 
corroborates our conclusion that the funding shock mainly affects credit availability via the 
discouragement of borrowers. Approval rates remain unaffected by this shock because the 
economy was still growing and borrower quality therefore not systematically changed. For the 
real economy shock, by contrast, our findings suggest that credit availability depends on the 
loan type. For agro loan borrowers, loan approval is hardly affected by this event. This is 
surprising on first sight since agro loans are regularly classified as particularly risky because 
of their highly correlated risks in case of natural disasters or commodity price fluctuations 
(e.g. Wenner, Navajas, Trivelli and Tarazona (2007)). In this economic slowdown, however, 
the agro businesses in Azerbaijan remain comparatively unaffected because they mostly grow 
fruits or vegetables or raise sheep for the local market. Thus, such loans may offer some 
                                                 
4
 Prominent examples of other MSME banks which use pro-active strategies to distribute their products and 
services are the ProCredit Banks, BRI Indonesia and ASA Bangladesh. See also Bankakademie (2000). Most 
active marketing aims at increasing financial literacy or raising awareness of savings products, however these 
campaigns naturally also bring other banking services to the attention of potential clients. 
 5 
stability to a bank’s loan portfolio in this kind of global financial and economic crises. The 
same seems to apply to the diversification into different loan sizes: the (repeat) micro loans in 
our sample show a very small reduction in approval rates during the real economy shock 
period which may be explained by their lower risk because they produce subsistence goods 
for the local market. SME borrowers who are more likely to encounter fluctuating demand for 
their products therefore have to face the greatest cuts to their credit availability.
5
 
To confirm that the two crisis shocks have differential effects, we study an exogenous 
variation in the severity of the crisis shock and its impact on loan approval. We distinguish 
between locations in which the oil and gas industry is most important and the rest of the 
country and find that the real economy shock affects credit availability negatively especially 
in those locations that can be expected to be hit hardest, i.e. the petroleum locations. The 
funding shock, on the contrary, has no negative and no differential (except for SME 
borrowers) effect for petroleum- vs. non-petroleum locations.  
Thus, the funding and the real economy shock have distinct impacts on the availability of 
credit to agro, micro and SME borrowers. The funding shock leads to a temporary tightening 
in credit availability for all borrower groups via the discouragement channel, which is an easy 
and fast way to slow down lending activities to save scarce funds. In contrast, the impact of 
the economic downturn on credit availability strongly depends on firm size and on the 
industry a firm operates in, by mainly reducing the availability of SME loans. This can be 
explained by the respectively different deterioration in credit quality due to the worsening 
economic situation, while borrower quality was not affected during the time of tight 
refinancing. Thus, in the real shock situation a more sophisticated mechanism, i.e. increased 
screening effort to single out the less risky clients, seems the more adequate strategy. Finally, 
we find that bank-borrower relationships are an important determinant for increasing credit 
availability in good as in bad times. 
Our study contributes to the literature on the transmission of the recent crisis and its 
impact on bank lending. De Haas and Van Horen (2010) analyze in the syndicated loan 
market how banks adjust their lending behavior during a financial crisis and find that the 
reduction in bank lending during the crisis can at least partly be attributed to banks’ increased 
monitoring and screening efforts. Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2012) and Puri, 
                                                 
5
 Although SMEs saw their sales drop, they may still have had a need for working capital to bridge temporary 
liquidity gaps. Demand for such loans may actually have increased during the economic downturn because, in 
contrast to AccessBank, most other Azeri banks faced liquidity problems during the last quarter of 2008. We find 
evidence in the empirical analysis that loan applications of new SME borrowers indeed increase after the onset 
of the economic slowdown, while loan applications from repeat SME borrowers decrease. However, for both 
groups the approval likelihood decreases indicating an increased riskiness of SME borrowers in general. 
 6 
Rocholl and Steffen (2010) match information from loan applications and loan contracts to 
disentangle whether reduced credit availability is the result of demand or supply determinants. 
Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2012) find for their sample of Spanish firms that bank 
balance-sheet strength determines loan approval in crisis times. Firm balance-sheet strength 
determines loan granting in good as well as in crisis times but matters more during the latter. 
Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010) study the effects of the financial crisis on retail lending at 
German savings banks and find a general decrease of loan demand after the beginning of the 
crisis. On the supply side, it turns out that affected banks are less likely to grant loans but that 
bank relationships help to mitigate this effect. Finally, Popov and Udell (2011) find cross-
country evidence for Eastern Europe that firms located in areas served by foreign banks 
whose parent banks experience financial distress have a higher probability to be credit 
constrained. 
In contrast to these papers, our study focuses on two distinct shocks occurring during the 
crisis and can thereby disentangle how different shocks impact on different borrower groups.
6
 
Our results imply that a funding shock may also show up in a reduced number of loan 
applications (i.e. on the demand side), while a real economy shock may impact on loan 
approval (i.e. on the supply side). Undoubtedly, having information on loan applications is an 
important feature in better disentangling demand and supply effects in bank lending during 
crisis times. Our results, however, indicate that information from loan applications may not be 
the remedy per se and future research in this area may need to more explicitly account for the 
different mechanisms banks have at hand to react to certain shocks. Our paper sheds some 
first light on these mechanisms.  
Finally, our study is related to the literature on the performance of MSME banks and 
their portfolios during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. By analyzing the effects 
of the crisis on Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), one of the largest MSME banks in the world, 
Patten, Rosengard and Johnston (2001) find nearly no effects on repayment behavior in the 
microfinance portfolio, while non-performance rates increased considerably in the SME 
portfolio suggesting that micro loans are less risky in times of crises compared to SME loans. 
Since higher default rates and reduced credit availability may both be outcomes of higher 
credit risk, we complement these results by showing that credit availability is similarly less 
affected for micro loans than for SME loans during the 2007-2009 financial and economic 
crisis. 
                                                 
6
 In such, it is also related to the studies on specific liquidity or supply shocks to banks (e.g. Khwaja and Mian 
(2008) and Paravisini (2008)). 
 7 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on 
Azerbaijan’s economy and how it was affected by the financial crisis. Section 3 describes the 
institutional background as well as the data and methodology while section 4 reports the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Azerbaijan’s economy and the financial crisis 
Azerbaijan’s economy is highly dependent on the oil and gas sector. The high real 
growth rates of 12 percent on average since 1998 with a peak in 2007 of 25 percent would not 
have been possible without the oil sector which accounts for about 60 percent of GDP and 95 
percent of all exports (Economist Intelligence Unit (2009b)). Furthermore, growth is 
concentrated in urban areas and in the extractive sectors leading to high disparities within the 
country. Thus, while the average per capita income (in PPP) was at 11,413 USD in 2008 – 
corresponding de facto to a middle income country – an estimated 20 percent of the whole 
population still lives in poverty (Economist Intelligence Unit (2009b)). The omnipresent 
corruption and state interventions in the economy also hinder the future development of the 
country.
7
 
The banking sector in Azerbaijan has shown high growth rates over the last years, 
starting from a relatively low level. Total sector assets grew by 78 percent to 8 billion USD in 
2007 while the total loan portfolio increased by 102 percent to 5.4 billion USD (Central Bank 
Azerbaijan (2008)). Yet, financial intermediation measured as total banking assets over GDP 
was with 27 percent at year end 2007 still low.
8
 The sector remains highly concentrated with 
the only state-owned bank (International Bank of Azerbaijan) accounting for 39 percent of 
total banking assets in April 2009. The microfinance sector is targeted by 12 banks and 20 
non-banks and even though the high number of banks may lead to the impression that the 
country is over-banked, access to credit for micro and small enterprises remains one of the 
main impediments for further growth especially in rural areas (IFC (2009)).  
The global financial and economic crisis affected Azerbaijan’s economy from the fourth 
quarter of 2008 onwards and growth slowed down to 9% in 2009. Compared to other CIS 
countries such as Georgia, the Ukraine or Russia the overall macroeconomic and financial 
situation seems rather comfortable due to the high growth rates and the constant inflow of 
hard currency during the years before the crisis. While other CIS countries suffered from high 
                                                 
7
 In 2008, Azerbaijan has ranked 158
th
 out of 180 countries on the list of Transparency International 
(Transparency International (2008)).  
8
 For means of comparison, Georgia and Russia have financial intermediation ratios of 42 and 52 percent, 
respectively. 
 8 
currency devaluation, Azerbaijan’s local currency, the Manat, remained stable. However, 
what was felt in the economy and in particular in sectors such as trade and construction was 
the drop in oil prices. Sectors that remained more or less unaffected were those which are 
mainly independent from international markets such as agriculture. Thus, the vulnerability of 
the Azerbaijani economy mainly stems from the lack of diversification which will remain a 
challenge for the future (Hübner and Jainzik (2009)). 
With respect to the banking sector, indeed most banks had to stop lending at some point 
and the quality of the loan portfolio deteriorated from 2.2 to 3.2 percent of loans being 
delinquent by more than 90 days in the first quarter of 2009 (Central Bank Azerbaijan 
(2009)). With respect to deposits, crisis-effects were visible as business clients increasingly 
withdrew their savings to keep their businesses going and households attempted to convert 
their savings from Manat to USD due to their fear that the Manat would devaluate. The 
Central Bank provided comprehensive stabilization measures in the third quarter of 2008 
which included, among others, an emergency facility for liquidity support and a decrease in 
the refinancing interest rate from 12 to 3 percent (Hübner and Jainzik (2009)). And while the 
low financial intermediation would otherwise be considered unsatisfactory, it helped the 
banking sector to remain somewhat immune against the effects of the crisis as the sector as a 
whole is only integrated into global financial markets in a limited way. Nevertheless, those 
few banks which are globally connected directly felt the effects of the turmoil in financial 
markets. Apart from that, all Azeri banks had to deal with an increase in their customers’ risks 
when the economic crisis hit the country.     
 
3 Institutional background, data and methodology 
3.1 The bank 
The data we use for the empirical analysis was generated using the Management 
Information System (MIS) of AccessBank Azerbaijan.
9
 The mission of AccessBank is to 
provide financial services at European standards to micro and small businesses and low and 
medium income families while also offering products for larger enterprises.
10
 AccessBank 
was founded by international financial institutions, which are still shareholders today, in 
October 2002 under the name Micro Finance Bank of Azerbaijan (MFBA). Until today, 
                                                 
9
 To get a better understanding of the bank’s business, the different loan types and borrower groups as well as the 
crisis events, we conducted informal interviews with the bank’s management. 
10
 See http://www.accessbank.az/en/index.html or AccessBank (2008) for detailed information on the bank and 
its business activity.  
 9 
AccessBank is the only fully-fledged bank targeting the micro and small business sector in 
Azerbaijan.  
Besides the central branch in Baku, AccessBank has 22 branches located all over the 
country both in rural and urban areas. Still, as of July 2009, the loan portfolio is concentrated 
in the trade sector and in the Baku area. With respect to the total number of clients, 
AccessBank is with 63,432 business loan clients in July 2009 the leading bank in Azerbaijan 
and has a total market share of 38% in the microfinance sector. The bank has been profitable 
since 2004 and in 2008 the return on equity was at 44.4 percent. Despite the crisis, the 
portfolio quality is very good with a portfolio at risk (PAR>30 days) of below 1 percent in 
mid 2009.  
 
3.2 The borrower groups 
While AccessBank also offers retail and staff loans, its focus and thus the focus of our 
study is on business lending. Within the business portfolio, agro, micro and SME loans are 
offered. The agro loan product was developed in 2007 to target farmers and the agricultural 
sector by offering flexible disbursement and repayment schemes tied to the agricultural cycles 
and the respective cash-flows of agro-businesses. The agro clients of AccessBank mainly 
produce food crops and livestock for local markets so that the demand for their products 
should be relatively unaffected by the crisis. Micro loans have amounts up to 10,000 USD 
(from 2008 onwards up to 20,000 USD) and SME loans have amounts of more than 10,000 
USD (20,000 USD) and up to 500,000 USD.  
With respect to micro and SME borrowers in general, most microenterprises are in the 
business of subsistence goods and services for which demand does not decline much even in 
times of crisis (Littlefield and Kneiding (2009)). In Azerbaijan, as in other emerging markets, 
microenterprises are predominantly active in small-scale retail trade or transport. SME 
businesses, in contrast, are involved in a broader variety of activities and rather tend to 
provide non-essential goods and services (such furniture and household appliances or real 
estate services), for which demand typically decreases in economic downturns. In contrast to 
the large firms in the oil and gas industry, only very few MSMEs in Azerbaijan participate in 
foreign trade activities (IFC (2009)). However, SME borrowers are more likely than micro 
borrowers to have some of their income in foreign currency and are generally better able to 
deal with foreign currency risk because of their higher income streams (AccessBank (2008)).  
The two products not only differ by their loan sizes (and the general characteristics of the 
firms taking them out) but also with respect to the loan granting process. While a personal 
 10 
visit of the loan officer and an analysis of the business finances as well as the debt servicing 
capacity are part of the rigorous financial analysis of all business clients, the process is more 
structured for SME loans including the consideration of longer time-periods of data and 
financial projections. Therefore, the loan terms of SME loans capture a broader range of 
individual risk factors, whereas loan terms for micro loans are more standardized due to their 
small amounts. That the screening process for SME loans is more extensive becomes also 
apparent from the fact that the time between loan applications and the approval decision is 
longer for SME than for micro loans. 
Given the differences between the various loan types and the clients they target, we treat 
agro, micro and SME loans separately throughout our analysis.  
 
3.3 The dataset 
In total, the bank disbursed 251,211 loans to 151,533 clients since the start of its 
operations. We exclude all observations with missing loan or firm characteristics as well as all 
retail loans to private households and loans to bank staff to focus on the bank’s main client 
groups. Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the bank’s business loan portfolio since its 
start of operations. While Panel A shows the number of disbursed loans by year for our three 
loan categories of agro, micro and SME loans and the number of rejected loans, Panel B 
displays the respective total volumes of the loans disbursed. The majority of loans in our 
sample are micro loans (75% in terms of numbers and 56% in terms of volume). However, 
when considering total loan volumes, it becomes clear that SME loans make up a sizable part 
of the bank’s business loan portfolio with a share of 35%. Agro loans, which were introduced 
in 2007, seem to play an increasingly important role in the bank’s lending business. Rejection 
rates were substantial in the beginning of the bank’s operations but have come down to less 
than 6% in 2009. One explanation is that the bank deals with more and more repeat clients 
over time so that it can assess their credit risk better due to reduced informational 
asymmetries. At the same time, (potential) borrowers might have become acquainted to the 
bank’s loan granting standards and have learnt to better self-assess whether their loan 
application will be successful (see Kirschenmann (2011) for borrower learning in repeated 
interactions with the same lender).  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 11 
For each loan the dataset includes information on the loan amount and currency 
requested by the borrower as stated in the loan application form as well as the granted loan 
terms (amount, maturity and collateral) as stated in the loan contract. Furthermore, the data 
not only contains information on the actual clients, but also on those who applied for a loan, 
but were rejected. Table 2 provides definitions of all variables. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
To examine relatively balanced time periods around the crisis shocks and to make sure 
that our results are not driven by possible procedural changes during the early years of the 
bank’s operations, we concentrate our empirical analysis on those loans disbursed from the 
beginning of 2006 onwards until the end of our observation period in August 2009.
11
 We also 
focus on the branches that were established before the crisis so that we have observations for 
both time periods (before and after the various crisis events) and our results are not biased 
because of a change in the geographical distribution of customers. This final sample consists 
of 168,483 loan applications from 88,370 firms. 
 
3.4 The timeline of events and the impact of the crisis on credit availability 
Since we observe both loan applications and actually granted loans we are able to 
establish the impact of the financial crisis on borrowers’ requests and the bank’s decision to 
approve or reject the loan application and to assess whether the three subgroups of loans are 
affected differently. Figure 1 displays the timeline of events related to the international 
transmission of the financial crisis to AccessBank. In particular, two major crisis events that 
may influence loan demand and supply decisions occurred in 2008.  
Firstly, AccessBank experienced unexpected, temporary delays in its refinancing pipeline 
during the second and third quarters of 2008 so that it did not have as much funding as would 
have been needed to meet total credit demand. These delays can be considered unexpected 
because AccessBank’s financial performance was strong throughout our observation period. 
More specifically, with respect to debt refinancing, the bank attracted funds from various 
international financial institutions (not only the shareholders) and received two funds 
denominated in Manat from private capital sources. AccessBank has been rated BB+ by Fitch 
Ratings – the highest rating in Azerbaijan – which helped it to complete the first bond issue 
on international capital markets by an Azeri issuer in February 2008. Also, the deposit 
                                                 
11
 We also run all of our regressions with the full sample of loans extended since the bank’s start of operations in 
October 2002 and find our main conclusions to hold. 
 12 
portfolio was growing. Thus, the temporarily tight refinancing was not at all caused by a 
change in the investors’ perception of the institution but solely by the turmoil in capital 
markets which induced the cancellation of and delay in international refinancing. International 
capital markets were unable to provide the necessary liquidity because, for instance, a planned 
CDO could not be placed in the prevailing environment.  
Together with the strong portfolio growth, these unexpected funding difficulties forced 
the bank to slow down its lending activities while the economy (as most other emerging 
market economies) was still growing. At the same time, it successfully undertook efforts to 
secure additional, initially not planned, financing and the funding situation relaxed from the 
fourth quarter of 2008 onwards although the financial crisis had reached its peak with the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. At first sight, this may seem counterintuitive but (commercial) 
investors in microfinance have shown a “flight to quality” in times of crisis (Standard & 
Poor's (2008)) corroborating the overall excellent performance of AccessBank during the 
crisis. Summarizing, this first event can be considered as a pure funding or supply side shock 
while there was no confounding shock to the demand side. 
Generally, one would expect this event to mainly influence the bank’s ability to meet 
given loan requests. However, the tight refinancing may also mirror itself in the number of 
loan applications because of the particular marketing strategy of AccessBank (and similar 
MSME banks). All in all, it seems that MSMEs in Azerbaijan, and those that have never had a 
loan before in particular, do not know much about the services banks offer and complain 
about their terms and conditions although only knowing them by word of mouth (IFC (2009)). 
To attract new borrowers, the bank therefore regularly organizes local community events to 
market its products (AccessBank (2007)). During the time of tight refinancing, loan officers 
were encouraged to take vacation which is equal to curtailing the active marketing of the 
products and thus the number of loan applications may also decline due to the temporary 
squeeze in the bank’s liquidity. Therefore, we expect the tight refinancing to have a negative 
effect on all firms’ (agro, micro and SME) credit availability via the discouragement of 
potential borrowers. We do not expect to find an effect on loan approval rates because the 
economy was still largely unaffected by the crisis. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Secondly, together with the sharp decline in oil prices, the economic crisis finally hit 
Azerbaijan in the fourth quarter of 2008, exactly at the time when the funding situation of 
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AccessBank started to normalize. Some first spillovers of the economic crisis already 
occurred during the summer of 2008 when oil prices and exports started to decline. However, 
the sharp contraction of exports happened in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 
2009 with exports to the neighboring CIS countries exhibiting a more sustained decline than 
total exports (see Appendix 1 for details). At the same time, households’ income streams were 
affected by the effects of this global crisis as remittances fell by around 20% in 2009 
compared to 2008 (World Bank (2011)). Together with the beginning slump of the retail car 
market and decreasing apartment sales reported in November 2008
12
 this implies that the 
demand for products, non-subsistence goods (and services) in particular, declined from the 
fourth quarter of 2008 onwards. Finally, bank credit to households contracted by around 2% 
in 2009 compared to a rapid expansion during the years before (Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2010)). Turning to the bank’s marketing efforts during this time period, in contrast to the 
period of tight refinancing, the availability of business loans was explicitly and actively 
marketed in 2009 to show AccessBank’s ability and willingness to be a reliable partner also 
during the crisis (AccessBank (2009)).  
Taking all this together, the effect of the real economy shock on the number of loan 
applications is ambiguous. On the one hand, loan applications could increase at AccessBank 
because of the liquidity problems and the reduced lending at other banks. On the other hand, 
loan applications could decrease because business borrowers saw their sales decline and thus, 
for instance, postponed investment. However, in contrast to the first event, we expect 
approval rates to decrease because of the worsening economic situation. Screening of 
borrowers should have become more important to identify the less risky as borrower quality 
in general started to deteriorate. We expect to find a differential effect for agro, micro and 
SME borrowers. SME loans are likely to be affected most because SME firms often produce 
non-subsistence goods or services or may even be suppliers to the oil industry and are 
therefore more likely to be hit by the economic slowdown and to see their credit quality 
deteriorate. 
Our empirical analysis will focus on these two distinct crisis events with the pre-crisis 
period comprising the years 2006 and 2007.  
 
3.5 Determinants of credit approval 
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 See Economist Intelligence Unit (2009a) and 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav120108a.shtml. 
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We analyze the effects of the 2007-2009 crisis on the availability of credit for our sample 
of agro, micro and SME loans with a linear probability model (LPM)
13
 in which the 
dependent variable Pr(Approved)i, k, t is the probability of firm i to receive loan k in period t: 
 
 Pr(Approved)i,k,t = αi + β1Ck,t + β2Lk,t + β3Fi,t + εi,k,t         (1) 
 
Ck,t is a dummy variable that indicates whether loan k was disbursed during one of the 
crisis events (i.e. the funding or the real economy shock) while Lk,t and Fi,t are vectors of loan 
and firm characteristics including 6 bank branch dummies that control for the location of loan 
origination. 
 
Crisis indicators and loan characteristics 
In line with the timeline of the crisis depicted in Figure 1, we include two dummy 
variables to compare each of the two distinct crisis periods of interest with the non-crisis 
years. Funding shock equals one during the months of tight refinancing between April and 
August 2008 and zero in the non-crisis years 2006 and 2007.
14
 Real economy shock, in 
contrast, equals one for those loans disbursed from October 2008 onwards and zero for the 
loans disbursed during the non-crisis years 2006 and 2007. We account for the structure of the 
bank’s loan portfolio by introducing the dummy variables Agro, Micro and SME which are 
one if the loan is an agro, micro or SME loan, respectively.  
We include Repeat loan as a relationship indicator since close bank-borrower 
relationships have been found to increase credit availability (e.g. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994)).
15
 It is a dummy variable indicating whether a loan is a firm’s later vs. first loan. We 
expect the bank to be able to gather valuable private information when interacting repeatedly 
with the same borrower, which, in turn, may benefit the borrower (see Allen and Gale (1999), 
Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000)). Additionally, if a firm requests a very high loan 
amount, the bank may be more likely to reject the loan application or to grant a considerably 
lower loan amount. Therefore, we include the variable Requested amount which is the 
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 We re-estimate all our regressions using probit and logit models. Since coefficients yield the same signs, we 
restrict the presentation of results to the LPM models due to the difficulty in deriving marginal effects in non-
linear regressions with interaction terms (see Ai and Norton (2003)).    
14
 Defining the pre-crisis period until August 2007 does not change our main conclusions but does not allow us 
to study the impact of the crisis on agro loans as these were only introduced in August 2007. The first quarter of 
2008 is left out from the refinancing shock analysis to make sure that periods are clearly marked-off from each 
other. Yet, our results are not sensitive to assigning Q1 2008 to the non-crisis period. 
15
 We repeat all estimations with two other relationship measures, the length of the bank-borrower relationship 
and the number of times a borrower has taken out a loan before the current loan, and find that results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
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requested loan amount in USD. The bank’s decision to grant a loan and its willingness to 
grant the requested amount should critically depend on the perceived risk of the loan. One 
means to make a loan safer is to pledge collateral. We include the variable Collateral which is 
the value of the pledged collateral as a share of the requested amount (in %). The dummy 
variable Manat requested indicates whether a loan is requested in the local currency Manat 
vs. in foreign currency (USD).  
 
Firm characteristics 
We include several firm characteristics that may influence the bank’s decision to grant a 
loan. Since most of the firms in the sample are run by their owners, owner characteristics are 
of particular importance. First of all, we include the borrower’s Age (in years) at the time of 
the first loan with the bank. Older firm owners may be more experienced and therefore less 
risky borrowers, which would mean a positive relation between borrower’s age and credit 
availability. In microfinance, often the argument is made that women are better borrowers 
because they are more reliable in repaying their loans (e.g. Armendariz de Aghion and 
Murdoch (2005)). To capture a possible gender effect, we include the dummy variable Male 
which is one if the borrower is male and zero if she is female. A similar reasoning might be 
true for a Married (dummy variable that is one if the borrower is married and zero otherwise) 
borrower who has responsibility towards a family so that we expect to find a positive relation 
with credit availability.  
 
3.6 Summary statistics  
Table 3 presents summary statistics of our loan and firm variables for the approved loans. 
Panel A provides statistics for the full sample, whereas Panel B displays sample means by 
loan category for the periods before and during the Real economy shock. 
Panel A shows that most of the loan applications in our sample are successful (Approved) 
which may be another indication of informal discouragement of borrowers before they 
actually fill in a loan application. The statistics confirm that the majority of approved loans in 
our sample are micro loans with an average Requested amount of 3,986 USD. Interestingly, 
loans are regularly collateralized at clearly more than 100% (Collateral). Considering firm 
characteristics, the majority of borrowers are Male (83%) and Married (72%). 
  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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Panel B of Table 3 presents statistics for the three loan categories of agro, micro and 
SME loans. To assess changes in loan terms and the borrower pool along the crisis, it 
compares loan and firm characteristics of approved loans for the time before and during the 
Real economy shock. The statistics confirm that the availability of agro loans in terms of 
approval rates was not negatively affected by the Real economy event. For micro loans, the 
impact of the crisis on the credit availability is relatively small as well. For SME loans, in 
contrast, the probability that a loan application is Approved decreases by 6 percentage points 
after the economic crisis hit. The average Requested amount for all loan types increases 
regardless of the economic downturn. This is similar to Berg and Schrader (2011) who find 
increased demand of micro borrowers after unexpected external shocks such as volcanic 
eruptions. Collateral, in contrast, decreases for all loan types after the economic crisis hit 
which may be due to the fact that real estate prices dropped considerably. However, on 
average loans are still collateralized by much more than 100% during the economic downturn. 
Establishing good bank-borrower relationships seems to be especially important for 
micro and SME clients as the share of Repeat loans increases for both loan groups during the 
economic crisis. This confirms the graphical analysis in Figure 2 that existing bank-borrower 
relationships help to enhance credit availability in times of crises. Interestingly, the economic 
crisis influences the denomination of agro and micro loans considerably. After the onset of 
the economic downturn 90% of agro loans and 69% of micro loans are requested in local 
currency (Manat) compared to 49% and 41% before. This finding may at least partly be 
explained by the fear of a depreciation of the local currency towards the USD after the 
currencies of neighboring countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan plunged considerably due 
to the crisis, even though the Manat did in fact only depreciate little. The statistics on firm 
characteristics imply that the pool of borrowers is very similar in this respect before and 
during the economic crisis.  
   
4 Results 
4.1 Graphical analysis of loan applications and approvals 
Figures 2 and 3 display the number of loan applications (168,483 in total) and loan 
approvals (158,481 in total) and the respective approval rates during the period 2006 to 2009 
for new vs. repeat borrowers in our three subsamples respectively.  
  
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 here] 
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Figure 2 shows that loan applications and approvals develop differently for the three 
subgroups. Agro loan applications drop considerably between April and June 2008, but 
interestingly, repeat borrowers are much less discouraged.
16
 After this short period of 
retrenchment loan applications again steadily increase for both new and repeat borrowers 
(Figure 2a). This is a first indication that the agricultural sector remained mostly unaffected 
by the economic crisis. Nevertheless, the bank’s tight refinancing clearly affects agro lending 
because clients were obviously deterred from applying for loans. Loan approval rates 
(approved loans as a share of applied loans) decrease somewhat, for the new borrowers in 
particular, during the period of the tight refinancing but remain at high levels of more than 
94% afterwards (Figure 3a).  
For micro loans, we similarly observe a considerable decrease in loan applications in the 
second quarter of 2008 for new and repeat loans (Figure 2b). The approval rate analysis 
(Figure 3b) shows that new micro loans are on average about 4 percentage points less likely to 
be approved than repeat micro loans and that approval rates are more volatile for new than for 
repeat micro borrowers. However, while the discouragement effect seems to be smaller for 
repeat borrowers, their approval rates decrease slightly after the economic crisis hit. These 
findings suggest that both the bank’s liquidity squeeze as well as the economic downturn 
affected micro borrowers’ credit availability 
Figure 2c reveals that the demand for new and repeat SME loans is more volatile; 
however there is also a clear decline in the number of loan applications after March 2008. 
Considering the approval rates of SME loans (Figure 3c), we observe a negative trend after 
the start of the economic crisis. Approval rates for SME loans decrease much more than for 
agro and micro loans from around 90% to 50% for new SME loans and from above 95% to 
75% for repeat SME loans. This indicates that the comparatively bigger firms in our sample 
are more seriously hit by the crisis. There are several potential reasons for these findings: 
First, during the tight refinancing period it may have been easier and cheaper for the bank to 
“save” a certain amount of liquidity by discouraging as well as denying some SME loans in 
contrast to an even larger number of micro loans. Second, the larger firms may have had to 
cope with a larger and more persistent decrease in demand for their products once the 
economic crisis hit implying that lending to the more heterogeneous SMEs became more 
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 Partly the drop may be due to seasonal effects as agro clients’ income streams usually peak in spring and 
summer. However, if the decrease was only driven by cyclical patterns in agriculture, effects should have been 
similar for new and repeat agro borrowers (as is the case exactly one year later during the second quarter of 
2009). Apart from that, micro and SME loans show a sharp decrease in loan applications starting at exactly the 
same point in time.  
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risky than lending to agro and micro businesses.
17
 Third, SME clients are more likely to 
finance fixed assets which are first to be postponed in times of crises while micro clients often 
take out working capital loans. And fourth, with a decrease in housing prices in Azerbaijan, 
borrowing to finance real estate became less attractive.  
The graphical analysis in Figure 2 suggests that both external events have an impact on 
the lending operations of AccessBank but that these effects vary for the three different types 
of loans. While credit availability for agro borrowers decreases for a very short period during 
the refinancing delays, credit availability for micro borrowers is tightened moderately and for 
SME borrowers most persistently.
18
 Apart from that, Figure 2 establishes the different 
channels through which the funding and the real economy shock influence credit availability. 
The refinancing delays seem to mainly work via the discouragement channel (i.e. less active 
marketing, loan officers on holidays), whereas the real economy effect works via the loan 
approval channel as well. 
 Moreover, the analysis shows that previous bank relationships help borrowers to 
mitigate negative crisis effects which is in line with the findings of, for instance, Berg and 
Schrader (2011) and Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010). This relationship effect works mainly 
through the discouragement channel, i.e. repeat borrowers are less likely to be discouraged. If 
they apply for a loan, their approval likelihood is generally higher than that for new 
borrowers, but it also decreases during the economic downturn. 
As the structure of our dataset also allows us to measure credit availability on an 
individual level, the following analysis will be concerned with the impact of the crisis on loan 
approval rates.  
 
4.2 Funding shock and the likelihood that a loan application is approved 
We start our analysis by studying the effect of the unexpected refinancing delays on the 
likelihood that a loan application is approved by the bank. Table 4 reports results from LPM 
regressions for the full sample and our three subsamples based on our three loan categories. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the borrower 
level. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 so that they can directly be read as percentages. 
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 Interestingly, Figure 2 also shows that loan applications of new borrowers increase after the onset of the 
economic slowdown, while loan applications from repeat borrowers decrease. This is in line with our reasoning 
that loan applications may actually increase during the economic downturn because of the liquidity problems of 
other Azeri banks. However, the decline in approval likelihoods for both new and repeat SME clients indicates 
the increased riskiness of SME borrowers in general. This also indicates that intense screening is the adequate 
mechanism to deal with a shock that is a pure real economy shock for AccessBank but also a liquidity shock for 
the other banks in the country. 
18
 Analyzing total loan volumes and volume constraints also reveal that SME borrowers are most affected by the 
crisis. 
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The results confirm the evidence from the graphical analysis and show that the refinancing 
shock mainly impacted on firms’ credit availability via the discouragement channel. Those 
loans that were actually applied for have, if anything, a higher likelihood to be approved 
during the months of tight refinancing compared to the non-crisis years of 2006 and 2007.  
The estimates in Column (1) show, for the full sample, that the approval likelihood for 
loan applications of SME borrowers (the base category) made during the Funding shock is 2.9 
percentage points higher than their approval likelihood during the non-crisis period. Agro and 
Micro loan applications are significantly more likely to be successful than SME loan 
applications during the non-crisis years. On average, agro (micro) loan applications have an 
8.4 percentage point (5.0 percentage point) higher probability to be finally granted compared 
to SME loan applications in 2006 and 2007. To study how the relation between our loan 
groups and the probability of loan approval is influenced by the funding shock, we study the 
interaction terms Agro*Funding shock and Micro*Funding shock. Both interaction terms are 
negative but only marginally significant and smaller than the main effects. This means that, 
during the time of tight refinancing, the difference in the probability to be granted a loan 
decreases somewhat when comparing agro and micro to SME loans but the former still have a 
higher approval likelihood. 
Columns (2) to (4) report estimates of LPM regressions for agro, micro and SME loans 
respectively to further disentangle differences in the factors determining loan approval rates 
for these three categories. Now, the main effect of our Funding shock indicator displays the 
impact of the unexpected refinancing delays on new loans’ approval likelihood showing that 
the Funding shock has no negative impact at all on loan approvals for those new loans that 
were actually applied for. The significantly positive main effect of Repeat loan implies that 
being a repeat borrower is crucial for increasing credit availability for all three loan groups in 
the non-crisis period with the effect being most pronounced for SME loan. Since SME loans 
involve considerably larger loan amounts, the information gathered from previous interactions 
with borrowers may be most valuable in this segment.  
The interaction term Repeat loan*Funding shock is insignificant for agro and 
significantly negative but very small for micro loans. This indicates that, whether in good or 
bad times, having a previous relationship with the bank is similarly beneficial in increasing 
the approval likelihood after applying for a loan. For SME loans, the interaction term Repeat 
loan*Funding shock is significantly negative but economically smaller than the main effect of 
Repeat loan. This means that repeat compared to new SME borrowers still have a higher 
approval likelihood during the time of tight refinancing but the difference in approval 
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likelihoods becomes much smaller. This is in line with the interpretation of the graphical 
findings that the relationship effect mainly works via less discouragement for the repeat 
borrowers during the time of tight refinancing. 
The denomination of the loan influences credit availability adversely for the three loan 
groups. While agro and micro loans are more likely to be approved when they are requested 
in Manat, SME loans requested in Manat are less likely to be granted. One explanation for 
this result lies in the bank’s funding structure. Since it receives most of its funding in USD, it 
has an incentive to lend on in foreign currency to prevent currency mismatches on its own 
balance sheet. At the same time, the bank seems to channel its funds according to the 
borrowers’ abilities to deal with foreign currency risks since SMEs are likely to be more 
capable to handle USD loans or even earn (some of) their income in USD (Brown, 
Kirschenmann and Ongena (2011) provide similar evidence for micro and SME lending in 
Bulgaria). 
Since the missing refinancing funds during the second and third quarters of 2008 were to 
be denominated in USD which should have impacted on the bank’s preferred lending 
currency we study the interaction term Manat*Funding shock for the three loan types in 
unreported regressions (results are available from the authors on request). Indeed, this 
analysis reveals that SME loans are less likely to be approved when requested in Manat only 
during the non-crisis period but actually more likely to be approved when requested in Manat 
during the time of tight refinancing. There is no such effect found for SME loans when 
studying the interaction effect Manat*Real economy shock. 
Turning to the impact of the firm characteristics, we find that only the variable Married 
has a uniform, significantly positive impact on loan approval rates for all three loan 
categories. Of all our firm characteristics it seems to provide the strongest signal to the bank. 
The borrower’s gender works in the opposite direction for SME and agro vs. micro loans. For 
SME and agro loans, being Male decreases the probability to receive a loan. Yet, male 
borrowers who request micro loans have a slightly higher probability to succeed in applying 
for a loan in comparison to female borrowers. Finally, a borrower’s Age at first loan 
disbursement plays a minor role in determining credit availability.
19
 
 
4.3 Real economy shock and the likelihood that a loan application is approved 
Table 5 re-runs our regressions from Table 4 but concentrates on the effect of the real 
economy shock on the bank’s decision to approve a loan application. As before, standard 
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 Including Age squared as an additional variable, we find Age to be positive and Age squared negative, but 
effects are either insignificant or very small. 
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errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the borrower level. All 
coefficients are multiplied by 100 so that they can directly be read as percentages. The results 
confirm the main hypothesis: the real economy shock has, in contrast to the funding shock, 
some negative impact on credit approval rates, but the effect varies significantly between 
agro, micro and SME loans. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
More specifically, in Column (1) the variable Real economy shock shows that SME loan 
applications made from October 2008 onwards compared to the non-crisis years have, on 
average, a 6.1 percentage point lower chance to be approved. The results on the differential 
impact of the real economy shock on loan approval in the three loan groups differ 
considerably from the funding shock results with both main effects and both interaction terms 
being significantly positive. This means that the probability to be granted a loan is not only 
higher for Agro and Micro loans compared to SME loans in the non-crisis years but that this 
effect is even more pronounced after the onset of the economic downturn. For instance, 
during the non-crisis years Agro loans are 6.8 percentage points more likely to be approved 
than SME loans. During the economic crisis, this difference in probabilities increases by 
another 6.6 percentage points. The effects are qualitatively the same for Micro loans, yet they 
are economically smaller.  
The separate regressions for agro, micro and SME loans respectively in columns (2) to 
(4) of Table 5 include the interaction term Repeat loan*Real economy shock to assess whether 
previous bank relationships are especially beneficial during the economic crisis. The main 
effect of our Real economy shock indicator displays the impact of the economic downturn on 
new loans’ approval likelihood. It is positive for agro and micro loans, however for the latter 
it is negligible in economic terms. For new SME borrowers, in contrast, the probability to 
receive a loan decreases during the economic crisis by 7 percentage points. As in the case of 
the tight refinancing period, we find that being a repeat borrower increases the likelihood of 
loan approval similarly in good as in bad times.
20
 The results for the other loan and firm 
characteristics are qualitatively very similar to Table 4. 
Summarizing, we find that the impact of the economic crisis on credit availability 
strongly depends on firm size and on the industry a firm operates in. These results relate to the 
specific structure of Azerbaijan’s economy with its larger firms being more dependent on oil 
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 The interaction effect is significantly negative for micro loans, yet it is economically not very large. 
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price fluctuations and facing more variable demand for their products. Micro firms, on the 
contrary, rather produce subsistence goods or deliver essential services and agro borrowers 
mostly grow fruit and vegetables or raise sheep for the local market so that both are 
considerably less affected by economic fluctuations. These varying levels of affectedness 
seem to influence the bank’s risk assessment of firms and to finally translate into accordingly 
varying levels of credit availability.  
 
4.4 Geographical variation in the crisis shock  
To confirm that the two shocks are distinctly different, we use the location of the branch 
that granted the loan, which is also a proxy for the location of the firm, to study exogenous 
variation in the severity of the crisis shock in the following analysis. Given that Azerbaijan’s 
economy is weakly diversified and highly dependent on the oil and gas sector, we distinguish 
between Petroleum locations, i.e. locations in which the oil and gas industry is most 
important according to the State Statistical Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan
21
 and the 
location of the major oil and gas fields, and the rest of the country. These petroleum locations 
are the capital city of Baku and the close-by next biggest city Sumqayit. We then analyze the 
interaction effects Funding shock*Petroleum location and Real economy shock*Petroleum 
location. We expect the latter interaction term to be significantly negative as the petroleum 
locations should be affected more severely by the economic downturn. In contrast, the 
funding shock led to short funding which should have restricted lending in all branches over 
the country. Therefore, we expect the interaction term Funding shock*Petroleum location to 
be statistically insignificant. 
Table 6 displays results for LPM regressions on the bank’s decision whether to approve a 
loan application or not for the full sample and the three subsamples based on our loan type 
categories. Columns (1-4) present the results for the effect of the funding shock, while 
columns (5-8) contain the respective results for the real economy shock.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
As expected, the interaction term Funding shock*Petroleum location is not statistically 
significant in the full sample as well as for agro and micro loans. Together with the 
significantly positive main effect Funding shock this indicates that for loans made in non-
petroleum locations approval rates for those borrowers who actually apply for a loan are 
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 See www.azstat.org/statinfo/industry/en/index.shtml#. 
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higher during the time of tight refinancing in comparison to the non-crisis years, while this 
effect is not significantly different in petroleum locations. For SME loans, in contrast, the 
interaction effect displayed in column (4) is significantly negative but economically smaller 
than the main effect of Funding shock. This means that SME loans made in petroleum 
compared to non-petroleum locations still have a higher approval likelihood during the time 
of tight refinancing but the difference in approval likelihoods becomes much smaller.
22
  
With respect to the real economy shock, we additionally deepen the analysis by dividing 
its effect into a short-term (Real economy shock 2008) and a long-term (Real economy shock 
2009) component capturing the respective months in 2008 or 2009 after the onset of the 
economic downturn.
23
 For the full sample in column (5), the very small positive main terms 
of Real economy shock 2008 and Real economy shock 2009 together with the larger and 
significantly negative interaction effects show that loans made in petroleum locations have a 
significantly lower approval likelihood after the start of the economic slowdown than loans 
made in non-petroleum locations. The latter finding also holds when studying the three loan 
categories separately in columns (6-8). For SME loans in column (8) the interaction terms are 
not statistically significant but economically relevant. We find that in the early months of the 
economic slowdown the approval likelihood of SME loans in petroleum locations also 
decreases, while, in contrast to agro and micro loans, this decrease is reversed again in the 
longer-term. Interestingly, we also find that SME borrowers seem to be hit by the crisis in the 
whole country, whereas agro and micro borrowers are only affected in petroleum locations as 
for the latter two groups the main effects Real economy shock 2008 and Real economy shock 
2009 are positive. For SME borrowers, in contrast, the approval likelihood for loans granted 
in non-petroleum locations also decreases significantly and considerably with some delay in 
2009 compared to the non-crisis years.   
These results confirm our hypothesis that the real economy shock is distinctly different 
from the funding shock. The real economy shock affects credit availability negatively 
especially in those locations that can be expected to be hit hardest, i.e. the petroleum 
locations. The funding shock, on the contrary, has no negative and no differential (except for 
SME borrowers) effect for petroleum- vs. non-petroleum locations. This confirms our 
previous finding that the refinancing delays are a pure supply shock impacting on credit 
availability mainly through the discouragement channel. 
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 This result is mainly driven by the fact that for the 10% of SME loans that are actually requested in non-
petroleum locations the approval likelihood increases considerably during the time of tight refinancing, while 
this increase is only very moderate in the petroleum locations where 90% of SME loans are applied for.  
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 Our conclusions are unaltered if we refrain from this additional time split, but the differential short-term vs. 
longer-term effect for SME loans would remain hidden in this analysis. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper studies the impact of the financial crisis on the credit availability for micro, 
small and medium enterprises in Azerbaijan using a unique dataset of 168,483 loans made 
between January 2006 and August 2009 by AccessBank Azerbaijan. The timeline of events in 
Azerbaijan allows us to study a pure supply side shock to the bank’s refinancing in the second 
and third quarters of 2008, while firms had not yet been affected by the economic crisis. 
Then, we can contrast its impact on credit availability for firms of different sizes and 
industries from the impact of the economic crisis shock that reached Azerbaijan in the fourth 
quarter of 2008. On top of this, the structure of the dataset allows us to analyze credit 
availability on an aggregate level as well as on an individual loan level, thereby identifying 
two major channels of credit constraints. 
By analyzing aggregate numbers of loan applications and approvals, we derive the first 
channel of credit constraints. We observe that its tight refinancing in the second and third 
quarters of 2008 seems to lead the bank to discourage (potential) borrowers from applying for 
new or additional loans. The bank’s temporary liquidity squeeze therefore resulted in a 
slowdown of its credit portfolio so that not all the demand could be met during this limited 
period of time. At the individual loan level, for the funding shock we find that approval rates 
for those (potential) borrowers who actually apply for a loan are not negatively affected in any 
borrower group. For the real economy shock, by contrast, our findings suggest that credit 
availability for agro loan borrowers is hardly affected by this event while micro loans face a 
moderate and SME loans a considerable reduction in approval rates. Apart from that, our 
results show that bank relationships help increase credit availability in good as in bad times. 
To gain deeper insights into the differential effects of the two crisis shocks on loan 
approval, we study an exogenous geographic variation in the severity of the crisis shock by 
distinguishing between locations in which the oil and gas industry is most important and the 
rest of the country. These results confirm that the two shocks differently impact on credit 
availability. The real economy shock affects credit availability negatively especially in those 
locations that can be expected to be hit hardest, i.e. the petroleum locations. Our results for 
the funding shock, on the contrary are in line with our previous finding that the refinancing 
delays are a pure supply shock impacting on credit availability mainly through the 
discouragement channel. 
In contrast to anecdotal evidence from some more advanced and competitive markets in 
Eastern Europe (e.g. ProCredit Holding (2009)) which suggests that banks worried especially 
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about their lending to micro clients and limited their exposure in that segment because many 
of these clients carried high levels of (consumer) debt, we find that credit availability is 
mostly affected for SME customers. However, one caveat has to be made concerning the 
interpretation of our results. To comprehensively assess the effects of the crisis on credit 
availability for the various types of enterprises one would have to more explicitly take into 
account how many borrowers have been deterred from applying for a loan by their loan 
officers. While we can provide some evidence on this aspect in our aggregate analysis, it is 
possible that the active marketing strategy which the bank uses to attract new customers is 
more intensively employed in the segment of micro loans compared to SME loans. This 
would imply that a decrease in these marketing activities would have a larger impact on the 
micro than on the SME loan portfolio and we would underestimate the negative effect of the 
crisis on micro credit availability. This opens up room for future empirical research to 
broaden the evidence on the effects of the financial crisis on credit availability.      
Our results have implications for policy makers and development practitioners aiming at 
sustainably fostering credit access for micro, small and medium businesses in developing and 
transition economies. First, supporting MSME banks in building up diversified credit 
portfolios that include various loan categories with respect to size and industry may increase 
these banks’ stability in times of a global financial and economic crisis as the 2007-2009 one. 
However, further research on how different banks’ portfolio quality is affected by such a 
crisis would be needed to shed more light on this aspect. Second, broadening MSME banks’ 
refinancing basis to achieve greater resilience against external shocks remains an important 
topic. Recent attempts to create adequate (long-term) refinancing instruments in local 
currency therefore seem to be a crucial step to help MSME banks to overcome refinancing 
problems.    
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Table 1. Lending by year and loan type 
 
This table reports statistics on the bank’s loan portfolio for the full sample and the following 
subsamples for the whole period since the bank’s foundation in October 2002: Agro: Loans intended 
for agricultural investments. Micro: Loans with loan amounts up to 10,000 USD (from 2008: also with 
amounts up to 20,000 USD). SME: Loans with loan amounts of more than 10,000 USD and up to 
500,000 USD. Rejected: Loan applications that were turned down by the bank. 
 
Panel A. Number of loans disbursed and rejected 
            
 Rejected Disbursed Total 
    Agro Micro SME   
2002 81  104   185 
2003 502  2,891 66 3,459 
2004 424  4,008 175 4,607 
2005 518  7,224 436 8,178 
2006 1,362  16,491 813 18,666 
2007 2,408 2,163 32,531 1,328 38,430 
2008 3,088 10,105 41,246 1,633 56,072 
2009 3,144 15,643 35,529 1,008 55,315 
Total 11,527 27,902 140,024 5,459 184,912 
      
 
Panel B. Total volumes of loans disbursed (USD) 
            
    Agro Micro SME Total 
2002   113,077   113,077 
2003   5,691,747 1,269,945 6,961,692 
2004   46,077,936 4,673,496 50,751,432 
2005   62,583,051 12,365,058 74,948,108 
2006   32,118,408 25,377,105 57,495,513 
2007  3,103,264 58,840,534 44,415,355 106,359,153 
2008  18,285,522 101,915,005 68,532,216 188,732,742 
2009   27,117,810 90,049,888 40,972,025 158,139,722 
Total   48,506,596 397,389,645 197,605,200 643,501,441 
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Table 2. Variable definitions 
  
    
Variable Definition 
  
Dependent variable   
Approved Borrower's loan request was approved (1=yes, 0=no) 
  
Loan characteristics   
Real economy shock Loan was granted after the onset of the economic downturn (10/2008) vs. loan was 
granted in 2006 or 2007 (1=yes, 0=no) 
Funding shock Loan was granted during the time of tight refinancing between 04/2008 and 08/2008 
vs. loan was granted in 2006 or 2007 (1=yes; 0=no) 
Agro Loan is an agro loan (1=yes, 0=no) 
Micro Loan is a micro loan with an amount up to 10,000 USD (20,000 USD from 2008 
onwards) (1=yes, 0=no) 
SME Loan is an SME loan with an amount between 10,000 (20,000) and 500,000 USD 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Requested amount Requested loan amount (USD) 
Collateral Value of collateral as a share of the requested amount (%) 
Repeat loan Loan is a repeat loan vs. first loan (1=yes, 0=no) 
Manat requested Loan is requested in the local currency AZN (Manat) vs. USD (1=yes, 0=no) 
Branch Branch dummies which are one if loan was granted at one of the following 
branches: Baku, Gyanja, Khachmaz, Lenkoran, Sheki and Sumqayit 
Petroleum location Loan was granted in a location with high importance of the oil and gas sector, i.e. 
Baku or Sumqayit (1=yes; 0=no) 
  
Firm characteristics   
Age Age of firm owner at date of disbursement of first loan (years) 
Male Firm owner is male vs. female (1=yes, 0=no) 
Married Firm owner is married at date of disbursement (1=yes, 0=no) 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A. Loan and firm characteristics 
 
This table displays summary statistics for our loan and firm variables based on the main analysis 
sample starting in 2006. See Table 2 for definitions of all variables. Note that summary statistics for 
the variable Approved are calculated including all loans while for all other variables only those loans 
that were approved by the bank are included in the calculations. 
            
 N Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Loan characteristics           
Approved 168,483 0.94 1 0 1 
Real economy shock 118,848 0.55 1 0 1 
Funding shock 76,131 0.30 0 0 1 
Agro 158,481 0.18 0 0 1 
Micro 158,481 0.79 1 0 1 
SME 158,481 0.03 0 0 1 
Repeat loan 158,481 0.47 0 0 1 
Requested amount 158,481 3,986 2,000 80 5,000,000 
Collateral 158,481 275 192 0 34,618 
Manat requested 158,481 0.59 1 0 1 
      
Firm characteristics           
Age 158,481 42 42 19 83 
Male 158,481 0.83 1 0 1 
Married 158,481 0.72 1 0 1 
      
   
Panel B. Sample means by loan type and crisis 
 
This table reports sample means of our loan and firm variables for the non-crisis (years 2006 and 2007) and the Real economy shock period for the subsamples of 
Agro, Micro and SME loans. ***, **, * denote that variables are significantly different from each other at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level using a two-sided T-test. 
See Table 2 for definitions of all variables. Note that summary statistics for the variable Approved are calculated including all loans while for all other variables 
only those loans that were approved by the bank are included in the calculations. 
                          
 Agro loans Micro loans SME loans 
 
Real 
economy 
shock = 0 
Real 
economy 
shock = 1 Diff 
Real 
economy 
shock = 0 
Real 
economy 
shock = 1 Diff 
Real 
economy 
shock = 0 
Real 
economy 
shock = 1 Diff 
 N = 2,163 N = 18,366    N = 49,022 N = 45,776    N = 2,141 N = 1,380   
               
Loan characteristics                         
Approved 0.95 0.96 -0.02 *** 0.94 0.94 -0.01 ** 0.89 0.84 0.06 *** 
Repeat loan 0.34 0.34 0   0.40 0.56 -0.16 *** 0.70 0.73 -0.03 ** 
Requested amount 1,710 2,180 -470 *** 2,271 3,109 -838 *** 41,333 51,307 -9,973 *** 
Collateral 343 240 251 *** 357 202 155 *** 501 462 40 ** 
Manat requested 0.49 0.90 -0.41 *** 0.41 0.69 -0.28 *** 0.02 0.01 0.01  
               
Firm characteristics                         
Age 44.47 43.68 0.79 *** 42.25 40.97 1.28 *** 43.46 42.68 0.78 *** 
Male 0.88 0.90 -0.02 *** 0.83 0.80 0.03 *** 0.91 0.91 0  
Married 0.80 0.79 0.01   0.72 0.70 0.03 *** 0.83 0.82 0.01   
             
 
   
Table 4. Funding shock and loan approvals 
 
This table reports results from LPM regressions for the full sample and the subsamples of Agro, Micro 
and SME loans for the period 2006-2009. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and account for 
clustering at the borrower level. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 so that they can directly be read 
as percentages. The dependent variable is Approved which is a dummy variable indicating whether a 
loan application was approved by the bank or rejected. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 
2. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level 
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Agro loans Micro loans SME loans 
          
Funding shock 2.946*** 0.951 1.391*** 7.027*** 
 (1.125) (0.826) (0.347) (2.485) 
Agro 8.409***    
 (0.865)    
Micro 5.000***    
 (0.726)    
Agro*Funding shock -2.251*    
 (1.252)    
Micro*Funding shock -1.979*    
  (1.141)       
Repeat loan 5.460*** 2.299** 5.701*** 10.831*** 
 (0.170) (0.938) (0.206) (1.471) 
Repeat loan*Funding shock  0.546 -0.836** -6.452** 
    (1.091) (0.396) (2.713) 
Ln(Requested amount) -0.579*** 2.123*** -0.655*** -0.198 
 (0.136) (0.495) (0.144) (0.763) 
Collateral 0.006*** 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manat requested 1.250*** 1.633** 1.222*** -9.182* 
  (0.193) (0.712) (0.201) (5.170) 
Age 0.018* 0.008 0.024** -0.081 
 (0.010) (0.027) (0.010) (0.066) 
Male 0.660*** -1.362* 0.895*** -3.359** 
 (0.238) (0.725) (0.253) (1.637) 
Married 1.245*** 1.455** 1.153*** 2.913** 
  (0.223) (0.733) (0.236) (1.479) 
Constant 86.619*** 74.273*** 91.778*** 86.720*** 
  (1.659) (4.510) (1.267) (9.061) 
Observations 80,277 6,303 70,765 3,209 
R² adjusted 0.035 0.043 0.035 0.045 
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
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Table 5. Real economy shock and loan approval 
 
This table reports results from LPM regressions for the full sample and the subsamples of Agro, Micro 
and SME loans for the period 2006-2009. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and account for 
clustering at the borrower level. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 so that they can directly be read 
as percentages. The dependent variable is Approved which is a dummy variable indicating whether a 
loan application was approved by the bank or rejected. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 
2. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Agro loans Micro loans SME loans 
          
Real economy shock -5.403*** 2.695*** 0.678** -6.998*** 
 (1.077) (0.687) (0.292) (2.448) 
Agro 6.760***    
 (0.846)    
Micro 3.999***    
 (0.709)    
Agro*Real economy shock 6.555***    
 (1.182)    
Micro*Real economy shock 5.518***    
  (1.089)       
Repeat loan 4.991*** 2.717*** 5.906*** 10.325*** 
 (0.145) (0.932) (0.204) (1.475) 
Repeat loan*Real economy shock  -1.520 -1.311*** 1.699 
    (0.968) (0.317) (2.678) 
Ln(Requested amount) -0.793*** 1.427*** -0.866*** -0.807 
 (0.124) (0.355) (0.133) (0.808) 
Collateral 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manat requested 1.359*** 2.747*** 1.246*** -14.507*** 
  (0.173) (0.534) (0.182) (4.933) 
Age 0.014* 0.007 0.023** -0.109* 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.064) 
Male 0.230 -1.543*** 0.502** -0.667 
 (0.194) (0.392) (0.212) (1.718) 
Married 1.012*** 0.743* 0.939*** 3.166** 
  (0.184) (0.410) (0.202) (1.430) 
Constant 89.869*** 76.688*** 93.750*** 92.561*** 
  (1.518) (3.085) (1.155) (9.581) 
Observations 118,135 17,536 96,608 3,991 
R² adjusted 0.031 0.040 0.028 0.054 
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
     
 
 
   
Table 6. Loan approvals and firm location 
 
This table reports results from LPM regressions for the full sample and the subsamples of Agro, Micro and SME loans for the period 2006-2009. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses and account for clustering at the borrower level. All coefficients are multiplied by 100 so that they can directly be read as percentages. 
The dependent variable is Approved which is a dummy variable indicating whether a loan application was approved by the bank or rejected. All explanatory 
variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
                    
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Full 
sample 
Agro 
loans 
Micro 
loans 
SME 
loans  Full sample 
Agro 
loans 
Micro 
loans SME loans 
                    
Petroleum location 1.564*** 2.609** 1.521*** 6.614* Petroleum location 1.587*** 1.188** 1.480*** 0.774 
 (0.245) (1.151) (0.257) (3.403)  (0.178) (0.552) (0.197) (2.101) 
Funding shock 1.391*** 1.572** 1.198*** 12.078*** Real economy shock 2008 0.808** 1.824*** 0.415 3.517 
 (0.349) (0.715) (0.425) (4.306)  (0.341) (0.422) (0.503) (4.088) 
      Real economy shock 2009 0.973*** 1.453*** 0.859*** -11.766*** 
       (0.220) (0.291) (0.324) (3.579) 
Funding shock*Petroleum 
location -0.268 -1.366 -0.108 -10.596** 
Real economy shock 
2008*Petroleum location -1.584*** -3.423*** -1.092* -3.732 
 (0.394) (1.365) (0.466) (4.464)  (0.437) (1.251) (0.576) (4.356) 
      
Real economy shock 
2009*Petroleum location -1.744*** -0.908 -1.324*** 3.292 
            (0.269) (0.681) (0.361) (3.793) 
Agro 6.558***      8.344***    
 (0.709)      (0.558)    
Micro 4.472***      5.539***    
  (0.650)         (0.542)       
Constant 86.223*** 71.428*** 91.285*** 79.488***  86.744*** 75.843*** 93.324*** 79.263*** 
  (1.628) (4.421) (1.260) (9.086)   (1.303) (2.508) (0.993) (7.974) 
Observations 80,277 6,303 70,765 3,209  158,840 24,984 128,497 5,359 
R² adjusted 0.028 0.039 0.027 0.043  0.024 0.035 0.021 0.051 
Loan and firm characteristics yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Branch fixed effects no no no no   no no no no 
          
   
Figure 1. Timeline of events 
 
 
 
   
Figure 2. Loan applications and approvals for new vs. repeat borrowers 
 
This figure displays the total number of loan applications and approvals for the three subsamples of 
Agro, Micro and SME loans and for new vs. repeat borrowers respectively. The two vertical lines 
indicate the start of the funding shock (April 2008) and the real economy shock (October 2008). 
 
Figure 2a. Agro loans 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b. Micro loans 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2c: SME loans 
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Figure 3. Loan approval rates for new vs. repeat borrowers 
 
This figure displays approval rates for the three subsamples of Agro, Micro and SME loans and for 
new vs. repeat borrowers respectively. The two vertical lines indicate the start of the funding shock 
(April 2008) and the real economy shock (October 2008). 
 
Figure 3a. Agro loans 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. Micro loans 
 
 
 
Figure 3c. SME loans 
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Appendix 1. Exports 2006-2009 
 
 
Total exports (in thousand USD) 
 
 
 
Exports to CIS countries (in thousand USD) 
 
 
 
 
